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Executive Summary 
 
This paper critically reviews the draft of the Office of Management and Budget’s 
fifth report on the benefits and costs of federal regulation. The draft report is a significant 
improvement over previous reports in terms of the responsiveness to the congressional 
mandate, and the information it provides on recent improvements at OMB.  We think the 
changes that OMB has made to increase transparency and efficiency are significant. 
These include making greater use of the Internet to communicate information, sending 
letters to agencies encouraging specific regulations with net benefits, and providing 
information on turnaround time for reviewing rules. 
 
There is still room for substantial improvement, however. We offer six 
recommendations––one for Congress and five for OMB––that we believe would be 
helpful in holding regulators and lawmakers more accountable for the regulations they 
produce. Our recommendations focus on getting the regulatory agencies to produce better 
analysis, making that analysis more transparent and readily available, and making the 
regulatory process itself more transparent. 
 
We recommend that Congress require agencies to comply with OMB’s economic 
guidelines. We also suggest that OMB improve its report by including a scorecard on the 
extent to which regulatory analyses comply with their guidelines; providing more 
information on regulations aimed at reducing terrorism; and making greater use of its in-
house expertise to improve estimates of benefits and costs for individual regulations.
         1
An Analysis of the Fifth Government Report 
On the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 
 
Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. Litan 
 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has just released a draft of its fifth 
annual report to Congress on the costs and benefits of federal regulation.
1  The 
congressional act that calls for this year’s OMB report requires OMB to submit to 
Congress: estimates of the costs and benefits of federal regulation; its impact on non-
federal government, small business, wages, and economic growth; and recommendations 
for reform.
2  This year’s draft report is the most informative and useful report that OMB 
has issued on this subject.
3 
The report represents a significant improvement over past reports in several ways.  
The 2002 OMB report is the first in which OMB seriously addresses its mandate to 
suggest specific regulations in need of reform.  OMB also lists several constructive 
changes that it has made in its own procedures over the past year.   
In commenting on earlier reports, we listed various ways in which OMB could 
improve its annual report. We are delighted to find that several of those recommendations 
have been implemented in this year’s draft report.   
As noted in our previous analyses, however, we find that OMB is not adequately 
using the expertise of its own staff to furnish insights about the likely economic impacts 
of particular regulations. In particular, the staff could perform a valuable public service 
by assessing the quality of estimates submitted by the agencies charged with 
promulgating regulations.  
                                                 
1  See OMB (2002a).  
2 Section 624 of the FY2001 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act requires OMB to 
submit ‘‘an accounting statement and associated report’’ containing: ‘‘(1) an estimate of the total annual 
costs and benefits (including quantifiable and nonquantifiable effects) of Federal rules and paperwork, to 
the extent feasible: (A) in the aggregate; (B) by agency and agency program; and (C) by major rule; (2) an 
analysis of impacts of Federal regulation on State, local, and tribal government, small business, wages, and 
economic growth; and (3) recommendations for reform.”  
3  Although the report is published in the Federal Register by OMB, the particular office within the Office 
of Management and Budget that is responsible for reviewing rules submitted by agencies, issuing 
information quality guidelines, issuing prompt letters, and enforcing Executive Order 12,866 is the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). See Office of Management and Budget,  OIRA Q&As. 
Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/qa_2-25-02.pdf (last visited May 23, 2002).                                                                        2
We recognize that the issue of having OMB provide its own assessment of the 
quality of regulations is politically sensitive as well as time consuming. Short of offering 
its own views on the benefits and costs of regulations, OMB should develop a scorecard 
that objectively describes how regulatory agencies conform with various economic 
guidelines related to the development of good regulatory analyses. OMB could, for 
example, score regulations on how well they conform with their own guidelines to 
agencies for doing economic analysis.
4 
Section 2 identifies improvements in the report and constructive changes in 
regulatory oversight that are discussed in the report.  Section 3 suggests ways the report 
could be improved and lists specific recommendations.  Section 4 presents our 
conclusions. 
 
2. Improvements in the Report and Improvements at OMB 
 
This section identifies improvements in the report and improvements 
implemented by OMB that are discussed in the report. 
 
Improvements in the Report 
 
There were four significant substantive improvements in this year’s report: a 
description of actions taken on possible rules for reform; a new discussion of the impact 
of regulatory guidance and an invitation to submit information on this topic; new 
information on regulations related to terrorism; and a change in the measurement of total 
aggregate costs and benefits. 
In previous comments on the OMB annual report, we suggested that “OMB 
should examine strategic reforms that could improve the regulatory process.” In addition, 
“OMB should offer suggestions on how Congress could help make regulations and the 
regulatory process more transparent.”
5 
                                                 
4  For OMB economic guidelines, see OMB (2000b). 
5   See Hahn and Litan (2000).                                                                        3
  The 2002 report describes the first action taken by OMB on specific existing 
regulations that represent opportunities for reform.
6  In its 2001 draft report, the OMB 
asked the public to submit suggestions for regulations that presented opportunities for 
reform. In the final report of that year, OMB prioritized the 71 suggestions it received, 
and published details on each suggestion.
7  
This year, OMB has gone a step further in using public suggestions to help 
stimulate reform.  It states in this year’s report that for each suggestion that it reported as 
a “high priority” in 2001, it met with the relevant agency. In some cases, either OMB or 
the agency took additional actions based on the suggestion.  The report lists those 
actions.
8 
We think that reporting actions taken based on the public’s suggested reforms is a 
valuable addition to the annual report.  It is, as OMB states, an effective way to identify 
the regulations that present the best reform opportunities.
9 Using the Federal Register  to 
solicit comments and to report progress is an effective way of formalizing the reform 
process and making it more transparent.  
                                                 
6  The reform component of OMB’s mandate has been handled differently in previous reports.  In its second 
report, the OMB under the Clinton administration advocated the Administration’s proposal for electricity 
reform. See OMB (1999a, Chapter IV, §II).  The report issued in June 2000 addresses the reform mandate 
by listing regulations that agencies planned to issue as proposed or final regulations in the following year.  
The list did not contain existing regulations recommended for reform; it was a set of regulations taken from 
the list of agencies’ planned regulations that were published in the annually released Administration’s 
Regulatory Plan, which OMB stated “may be viewed as specific recommendations for regulatory 
improvement or reform based on statutory mandates and the Administration’s priorities.” OMB (2000a, 
Chapter V).  The 2001 report lists “Seventy one Suggestions From the Public for Reform” and OMB 
prioritizes the suggestions.  This year’s report is the first in which OMB reports action taken on reform 
suggestions.  See Appendix A, OMB (2001a, 65). 
7  See Appendix A, OMB (2001a, 65). 
8   See OMB (2002a, 15022) and status report on actions taken on “high priority” recommendations in 
Appendix B, OMB (2002a, 15036–15037).  The draft report that OMB published in May, 2001laid the 
groundwork for this process, stating, “we would like to receive suggestions on specific regulations that 
could be rescinded or changed that would increase net benefits to the public by either reducing costs and/or 
increasing benefits.”OMB (2001b, 22054).  
9  “Across-the-board reviews of all existing rules have been attempted in the past but have not always been 
particularly successful and have induced a questionable allocation of limited agency and OIRA resources. 
The Bush Administration believes that a targeted review process for existing rules, pursuant to public 
comment and new statutory authority provided to OIRA, is the best available mechanism to facilitate 
review of existing rules outside of the authority under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.” OMB (2002a, 
15022).                                                                        4
  OMB has also addressed its mandate to make reform recommendations by 
identifying the improper use of guidance documents as a problem in  the regulatory 
process.
10  The OMB report explains that “guidance (as opposed to regulations) is issued 
without notice and comment in order to clarify or explain an agency interpretation of a 
statute or regulation. These guidance documents may have many formats and names, 
including guidance documents, manuals, interpretive memoranda, staff instructions, 
policy statements, circulars, bulletins, and so on.”
11 
This is the first report in which OMB has identified a component of the regulatory 
process that has the potential to be improved.
12 OMB discusses the problem of misused 
guidance documents in this year’s report and “seeks public comment on the nature and 
extent of problematic guidance documents in agency policymaking.” It asks commenters 
to “submit to OMB a c opy of the problematic guidance, with any relevant portions 
identified.”
13  We think OMB’s identification of this reform opportunity is appropriate.  
OMB is fulfilling its obligation to make reform suggestions by using its expertise to 
identify practices that can be reformed, and involving the public to target potential 
reforms. 
This year, OMB also added a table providing information on regulations related to 
terrorism.  The table includes information on the issuing agency, sub agency, and 
rulemaking stage.  We think this is an appropriate addition to this year’s draft report 
because regulations related to terrorism are likely to be a subject of great interest, at least 
in the near future.  
OMB dramatically changed its approach to estimating the aggregate costs and 
benefits of regulation in this report. Instead of combining estimates from other published 
                                                 
10   Guidance documents can be a source of regulations without being subject to notice-and-comment 
procedures or other safeguards. “Through guidance documents, agencies sometimes have issued or 
extended their ‘real rules,’ i.e., interpretative rules and policy statements, quickly and inexpensively – 
particularly with the use of the Internet – and without following procedures prescribed under statutes or 
Executive orders.” OMB (2002a, 15034). 
11 OMB (2002a, 15034). 
12 Last year, OMB discussed the reinstatement of prompt letters, which was a reform of the regulatory 
process.  This is the first year, however, in which OMB identifies an existing component of rulemaking that 
could be changed, and where change would require a cooperative effort with the agencies.  
13 OMB (2002a, 15035).                                                                        5
work, it relied on its own database of regulations from April 1, 1995 through September 
30, 2001.
14   
We think this approach is preferable for OMB. Its comparative advantage does 
not lie in developing a sophisticated estimate of the costs and benefits of regulation based 
on other scholarship. We think its resources are better utilized in this area by extending 
the database it has developed over a longer time period.
15 The simplified and less 




Improvements at OMB that Were Discussed in the Report 
 
  In the 2002 report, OMB lists several changes in its procedures that it has either 
implemented or plans to implement.  Some of these changes were stated in the 2001 final 
report, but not in the 2001 draft report, and this is our first opportunity to comment on 
those changes.
17 For some of these changes, the 2002 draft report also provides important 
details. For example, the report states that OMB has reduced the turnaround time on 
approving agencies’ regulations and provides a table reporting turnaround time since 
1999.
18 We think that the new initiatives demonstrate an increased OMB effort to 
improve the regulatory process. 
                                                 
14 In previous years, OMB used other studies to derive an estimate of the costs and benefits of regulation in 
1988.  To estimate updated total costs and benefits, OMB then added estimates from its own collection of 
agency estimates for rules published since 1987, and from other more recent academic studies.  See OMB 
(1997, § II. 2. “Total Costs”) for an explanation of the methodology, which was replicated in each annual 
OMB report through 2001.  
15 As stated in a recommendation below, we also do not think that OMB should take the agency numbers, 
which make up the aggregate estimates, as given.  
16 In its 2000 report, OMB correctly noted that the aggregate estimates it had developed in previous reports 
were not very reliable for several reasons: “Most attempts to summarize the total costs and benefits of 
Federal regulations have simply added together a diverse set of individual studies. This is an inherently 
flawed approach. These individual studies vary in the quality, methodology, and type of regulatory impacts 
they include. They use different assumptions about baselines and time periods, different discount rates, 
different valuations for the same attribute, and different approaches to dealing with uncertainty.  They also 
are seldom able to analyze the interaction effects among the tens of thousands of regulations.  Although we 
are mindful of, and tried to correct for, these problems in our estimates, our numbers too should be used 
with caution.” OMB (2000a, 15). This year’s report includes similar comments.  See OMB (2002a, 15024). 
17 Prompt letters and return letters were discussed in the 2001 final report. See OMB (2001a, 39, 44). 
18 See Table 3, OMB (2002a, 15019).                                                                        6
  Table 1 summarizes seven reported improvements in OMB oversight and explains 
why we think they are constructive. 
  The use of prompt letters, which were discussed in last year’s final report, sends a 
strong signal that OMB is interested in adding new regulations where the benefits are 
likely to exceed the costs. This year, OMB sent letters to the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and two letters to the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Prompt letters counter the perception that regulatory oversight means 
criticizing and doing away with existing rules and help OMB encourage “government 
agencies to add regulations that make sense while cutting back on those that don't.”
19 
  By reviving the practice of returning rules, OMB also sent a strong signal to 
agencies that regulations would not be simply rubber stamped.  20 rules were returned to 
agencies between July 1, 2001 and March 1, 2002. 
20  In contrast, during the Clinton 
administration, very few rules were returned.
21 Indeed, in the last 3 years of the Clinton 
administration, no rules were formally returned, although we understand that OMB 
played a role in influencing a number of rules as they were being developed.
22  
Nonetheless, if the regulatory oversight agency returns no rules, there is a very real risk 
that regulatory agencies will no longer take the oversight function very seriously.
23 
We recognize that an increase in returned rules does not imply that the quality of 
the oversight is necessarily improved, that the quality of approved rules is necessarily 
improved, or that rules are being returned for legitimate reasons.    Executive Order 
12,866 requires that returned rules by accompanied by a written explanation from the 
Administrator of OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).  The 
                                                 
19 See Hahn and Sunstein (2001). 
20 OMB (2002a, 15014). 
21 “During the full eight years of the Clinton Administration, OMB returned for reconsideration 
approximately one rule in 500.” OMB (2002a, 15018).   
22“An average of 600 significant rulemaking actions were approved per year during the Clinton 
Administration. During the last three years of the Clinton Administration, there were exactly zero rules 
returned to agencies by OMB for reconsideration.” OMB (2002a, 15018). 
23 An alternative interpretation is that the regulated agencies were simply doing what the oversight agency 
wanted. We are skeptical that this was the case, since many of the regulations did not pass a benefit-cost 
test based on the agency numbers. For percentages of rules in which agencies find that benefits exceed 
costs, see Table 1, Hahn and Litan (1997).                                                                        7
Administrator must identify provisions of the Executive Order that were unfulfilled by 
the regulation.
24  OMB has generally clearly stated its causes for concern in returning 
rules in letters to the agency heads.  For example, in the most recent return letter that is 
posted on the OIRA website, the OIRA Administrator’s letter to the Department of 
Transportation stated that the agency’s Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems rule was being 
returned because “the analysis NHTSA has performed to date does not adequately 
demonstrate that NHTSA has selected the best available method of achieving the 
regulatory objective...” and that “the technical foundation for NHTSA’s estimates of 
safety benefits needs to be better explained and subjected to sensitivity analysis.”
25 
  One of the more controversial aspects of the OMB review process is the time it 
takes from start to finish. Some critics have argued that OMB takes too much time in 
reviewing certain rules, thus adding unnecessary delay to the development of regulations. 
To address this concern OMB has published information on the average turnaround time 
for rules that are submitted to OMB for review. For example, in July of 2001, 25 of the 
97 rules pending in OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs were pending 
for more than 90 days; in January of 2002, none of the 86 pending rules were pending for 
over 90 days.
26 Though OMB has made this information available before, this is the first 
time OMB has reported information on turnaround time as part of its annual cost benefit 
report.  We think it is one useful measure of OMB’s performance of its regulatory 
oversight function.
27 
  The report states several ways in which OMB is using the Internet to make 
information about itself and regulation available.  The report states that OIRA has 
increased the amount of information on its website, maintained an online log of its 
meetings to comply with the disclosure provisions of Executive Order 12,866, posted 
                                                 
24 “For each regulatory action that the Administrator of OIRA returns to an agency for further consideration 
of some or all of its provisions, the Administrator of OIRA shall provide the issuing agency a  
writtenexplanation for such return, setting forth the pertinent provision of this Executive order on which 
OIRA is relying.” See Exec. Ord. No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638(1994).  
25 We do not assume that the quality of the agencies’ finalized regulations is improved by quicker 
evaluation at OMB. 
26 Table 3, EO 12,866 Reviews Over 90 Days by Date.  OMB (2002a, 15019). 
27 We do not assume that the quality of the agencies’ finalized regulations is improved by quicker 
evaluation at OMB.                                                                        8
information about written correspondence from outside parties on regulations under 
review, and is working to allow “outside parties electronic access to the information now 
contained in OIRA’s docket room” by “linking up to the Administration’s E- government 
initiative.”
28  It also states that three of the seven new staff additions to OIRA “will 
buttress OIRA’s staffing in information technology and policy for the E -Government 
initiative.”
29 These actions illustrate OMB’s commitment to making the regulatory 
process more transparent. 
  In this year’s report, OMB states that it plans to devote more attention to the 
interaction between federal rule-making agencies and State and local governments. The 
report states that “this Administration will bring more uniformity to the consultation 
process to help both agencies and intergovernmental partners know when, how and with 
whom to communicate” and that “this Administration intends to enforce the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act to ensure that agencies are complying with both the letter and the 
spirit of the law.”
30  This shows that OMB may be paying more attention to the 
requirements of its enabling legislation.  In this year’s report, OMB asks the public for 
suggestions on how agencies’ consultation with small government can be improved and 
states that its final report will contain a discussion of agencies’ compliance with the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.
31 
  One important change reported this year is the increase in OIRA staff. OIRA has 
been understaffed relative to its workload for several years, thus making it difficult to 
carry out its functions effectively.
32 Indeed, a chart provided in the report shows that 
OIRA staffing declined steadily for ten years before the trend began to reverse in 2001.
33 
                                                 
28 OMB (2002a, 15018). 
29 OMB (2002a, 15022). 
30 “States and localities should have a clear point of contact in each agency, and agencies must understand 
that “consultation” means more than making a telephone call the day before a rulemaking action is 
published in the Federal Register.” OMB (2002a, 15039). 
31 OMB (2002a, 15039). 
32 “Another perspective on the problem of accurate regulatory accounting comes from the number of civil 
servants working on regulations compared with the number reviewing their economic content. While more 
than 130,000 fulltime-equivalent employees work at federal regulatory agencies, OMB’s Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs has only forty-two professionals, fewer than half of 
whom actually review the economic analysis in the RIAs.”  Hahn and Litan (1997, 19).  
33 See Table 4, OIRA Staff Ceiling,  OMB (2002a, 15021).                                                                        9
OIRA plans to add seven new staff positions, four of which are intended for staff with 
science and engineering expertise. We think it is particularly important that OIRA has 
access to individuals with scientific expertise because many of the most important 
regulations address complex environmental, health and safety issues.
34 
  Finally, the Director of the OMB has suggested that OIRA establish a scientific 
advisory panel. The report states that OIRA is in the process of forming such a panel, 
which will hold biannual, open meetings.
35  We think such a board could be helpful in 
advising OIRA on setting priorities, establishing guidelines for risk assessment and 
economics, and suggesting new approaches to improving information and risk 
assessment.  
 
3.  Recommendations for Improving the Cost-Benefit Report and Getting Real 
Results 
 
Although this year’s report improves on past years’ reports in several ways, we 
offer six specific recommendations aimed at improving regulatory analysis, making that 
analysis more transparent, and making the regulatory process itself more transparent. 
 
Recommendation 1 : The Congress should pass a law requiring that all 
regulatory agencies comply with OMB’s economic guidelines when analyzing 
the impact of economically significant regulations.
36,37 
There are three sets of guidelines issued by OMB with which agencies should be 
complying when they issue regulations.
38  The guidelines are: Guidelines to Standardize 
Measures of Costs and Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements, which were 
published on March 22, 2000; M -00-02, Guidance for Implementing E.O. 13132, 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Breyer (1993, 62).   
35 OMB (2002a, 15022-15023). 
36 For economic guidelines, see OMB (2000b).  OMB also ought to carefully monitor the extent to which 
agencies are adhering to the newly  issued Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, 
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies.  OMB (2002b).  
37 Executive Order 12,866 classifies a rule as significant if it has an impact on the economy of $100 million 
or more in one year. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act classifies a rule as significant if the regulation 
has an impact on the private sector and/or state or local governments of $100 million or more in one year. 
38 In addition, agencies’ regulations should comply with Executive Order 12,866.                                                                        10
"Federalism", which were published on October 28, 1999; and Guidelines for Ensuring 
and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, a nd Integrity of Information 
Disseminated by Federal Agencies, which were republished on February 22, 2002.
39 
The rationale is simple. OMB’s guidelines represent a set of principles for 
improving regulatory analysis and making the regulatory process more transparent.  They 
should be required for all significant regulations from both independent and executive 
agencies.  Unless the President decides that the regulation addresses an emergency, 
Congress should require that proposed regulations cannot move forward if the agencies’ 
RIAs fail to meet the guidelines.  
Currently, OMB has no effective mechanism for enforcing its guidelines and it 
needs one.  Previous efforts to enforce similar guidelines have fallen short of the mark.
40  
Moreover, agencies frequently fail to communicate their findings in a clear manner.
41   
If Congress does not pass the law that we recommend, enforcement authority for 
implementing the guidelines should be included in a new Executive Order that applies to 
the executive agencies. 
 
Recommendation 2: OMB should work to improve the quality and quantity 
of information at all federal regulatory agencies, so it can present a more 
realistic picture of what is known about the impacts of federal regulation in 
its report. 
OMB should ask all federal regulatory agencies to submit more data and better 
data on the costs and benefits of all important regulatory activities, making sure agencies 
adhere to the information quality guidelines set forth by OMB.
42 
                                                 
39 See OMB (2000b), OMB (1999b),  OMB (2002b).  The Information Quality Guidelines state that every 
federal agency must issue their own guidelines related to information quality. As a federal agency, OMB 
did this on May 1, 2002.  See OMB (2002c).  
40 See, e.g., Figure 5 in Hahn et al. (2000, 875), suggesting that agencies often do not quantify the impacts 
of alternatives in RIAs.  
41 See, e.g., Hahn and Litan (1997) and Arrow et al. (1996); also see Hahn (1999) for a specific suggestion 
for summarizing results in a “Regulatory Impact Summary” and using the  Federal Register to 
communicate findings of the regulatory analysis in a clear, concise fashion.  
42 See OMB’s Information Quality Guidelines, OMB (2002b).  These guidelines can be expected to 
improve the quality of information submitted to OMB by a regulatory agency, because they promote 
independent, external, expert peer review of an agency’s data, and stress that an agency’s data should be 
reproducible.  See OMB (2002b, 8459, 8460).                                                                        11
Requiring each regulatory agency to submit more and better data on the benefits 
and costs of all important regulatory activities would help present a better picture of the 
actual economic impact of federal regulation.
43  It would also make the regulatory 
process more transparent and help identify important gaps in our knowledge.
44  
To help fulfill this requirement, agencies should summarize each regulation that 
has been proposed using a standardized summary developed by OMB. This summary 
should also be included in each RIA that is submitted to OMB.
45 
 
Recommendation 3: OMB should rely more heavily on its own expertise to 
inform judgments about the benefits and costs of regulation. 
None of the OMB reports take advantage of the expertise that resides within 
OMB to evaluate the economic impact of regulations. The major advantage that OMB 
analysts have over other potential authors of this report, such as academics, is that they 
are more familiar with the details of particular regulations and regulatory analyses.  
 
Recommendation 4:   OMB should issue a scorecard assessing the extent to 
which regulatory analyses comply with their guidelines. 
It would be useful if OMB issued an annual scorecard identifying the extent to 
which regulatory analyses comply with its economic guidelines.
46 Providing information 




                                                 
43 This requirement should apply to all federal regulatory agencies, including those that are independent, to 
the extent permitted by law.   
44 A consensus seems to be emerging that the independent agencies are producing little information that 
evaluates the economic impact of their regulations. That finding is consistent with OMB’s review, a report 
by the General Accounting Office, and research by Furchtgott-Roth and Hahn. See GAO (1998), Hahn 
(2001) and Furchtgott-Roth (1996). Hahn (2001) and Furchtgott-Roth (1996) find that regulatory agencies 
provide very little information on the economic impacts of a large number of regulatory activities in which 
they are engaged.
 
45 For an example of such a summary page, see  Table 4, Hahn and Sunstein (2002, 1519). 
46 See OMB (2000b) for economic guidelines.  
47 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) or economists outside of the government could also perform 
this task.                                                                        12
 
Recommendation 5: OMB should provide more information on return letters 
and agency responses to return letters.  
OMB frequently asks agencies to address specific issues in their return letters.
48 
For example, OMB returned a rule to the Small Business Administration (SBA) with the 
request that SBA “should undertake a rigorous analysis consistent with the principles 
outlined under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and OMB Circular A-129.”  OMB 
returned a rule to the Department of Agriculture with the request that the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service evaluate the significant economic impacts of its proposed 
policy, as required by Executive Order 12,866.
49   We think that OMB should summarize 
the return letters it issues in this report, highlighting important concerns that it has raised 
in each letter. OMB ought to note, for example, when it returns a rule because of 
insufficient analysis and when it returns a rule because costs exceed benefits.  It should 
also note how an agency responds to specific return letters. This summary would provide 
the public with useful information on the nature of OMB’s concerns and the 
responsiveness of the agency to those concerns.   
 
Recommendation 6: OMB should improve its information on the economic 
impact of regulations aimed at reducing terrorism. 
OMB has taken an important first step in listing terrorism-related regulations, the 
agency responsible for each regulation, and whether a regulation has been finalized. We 
think it should ask relevant agencies to provide more information about the costs and 
benefits of those regulations. While, in many instances, it may be difficult to arrive at 
precise quantitative estimates of the benefits, some quantitative or qualitative description 
will be possible. In addition to encouraging the agencies to estimate the effects of 
terrorism-related regulations, OMB could become more involved in this process, and 
develop ways to measure the regulations’ effectiveness.  An attempt at measuring the net 
                                                 
48 A return letter includes the OIRA Administrator’s written explanation of the reasons that OIRA is 
returning the rule for further consideration. The written explanation is required by Executive Order 12,866.  
See § 6. (b) (3). Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638(1994). 
49 Return letters are available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html (last visited 
May 29, 2002).                                                                        13
benefits of different terrorism-related regulations will help policy makers and the public 
compare the merits of different regulatory options.
50  Estimating the costs and benefits of 
terrorism-related regulations will also help policy makers and the public assess whether 





This paper critically reviews the draft of the Office of Management and Budget’s 
fifth report on the benefits and costs of federal regulation. The draft report is a significant 
improvement over previous reports in terms of the responsiveness to the congressional 
mandate, and the information it provides on recent improvements at OMB.  We think the 
changes that OMB has made to increase transparency and efficiency are significant. 
These include posting policies and information on the Internet, sending letters to agencies 
encouraging specific regulations with net benefits, and providing information on 
turnaround time for reviewing rules.   
We also think it is important that OMB is asking the public to submit specific 
suggestions for constructive reform in a number of areas, including regulations, 
regulatory programs, and regulatory guidance documents. OMB should continue to use 
this information to help set priorities. 
There is still room for substantial improvement. We offer six recommendations––
one for Congress and five for OMB––that we believe would be helpful in holding 
regulators and lawmakers more accountable for the regulations they produce. Our 
recommendations focus on getting the regulatory agencies to produce better analysis, 
making that analysis more transparent and readily available, and making the regulatory 
process itself more transparent. 
                                                 
50 For a discussion of how the government can effectively deal with the risk of terrorism, see O’Hanlon et 
al. (2002).         14
  TABLE 1 – IMPROVEMENTS AT OMB DISCUSSED IN THE REPORT 
 
Change  Supporting Information 




Number of prompt letters 
issued (and their subjects and 
recipients)
52 
Increase in transparency, 
shows a concern for pro-
regulatory activity 
  Reinstating practice of returning 
rules with poor analyses to 
agencies   
Table reporting total number 
of rules reviewed and number 
of rules returned in each year 
since 1981
53 
More diligent evaluation of 
submitted rules 
 
Tracking turnaround time on 
agencies’ submitted rules 
Data on the turnaround time 
for returned rules since 1999
54 
Increase in transparency, 
responsiveness 
 
Increased use of Internet to 
publicize OMB actions 
Posting logs of meeting and 
correspondence with outside 
parties, posting prompt and 
return letters, continuing E-
government initiative 
Increase in transparency 
Initiative to improve agencies’ 




More serious consideration 




of the Unfunded Mandates 
Reform Act 
Increasing OIRA staff 
Table reporting OIRA staff 
ceiling since 1981


























Establishment of a science 
advisory panel
58   




                                                 
51 OMB (2002a, 15020). 
52 OMB (2002a, 15020).  The 2001 OMB final report discussed the return of the prompt letter and stated that 
OMB had already issued two prompt letters.  This year’s draft report presents our first opportunity to comment on 
the new practice, since prompt letters were not discussed in the 2001 draft report. 
53 Table 2, OMB (2002a, 15018).  The 2001 OMB final report discussed OMB’s plan to reinstate the return letter 
and included a table listing the number of returned rules between 1981 and 2000 OMB Table, in (2001a, 41).  
However, this is the first year in which OMB is actually reporting an increase in returned rules per year, from 0 in 
2000 to 18 in 2001.  See Table 2, OMB (2002b, 15018).  This report provides our first opportunity to comment on 
returned rules because the return letter was not discussed in the draft of the 2001 report.  
54 Table 3, OMB (2002a, 15019). 
55 OMB (2002a, 15039). 
56 Sec 638 (a)(2) of the FY2001 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act calls on OMB to present 
an analysis of the impacts of Federal regulation on State, local, and tribal governments, small business, wages, and 
economic growth. 
57 Table 4, OMB (2002a, 15021). 
58 OMB (2002a, 15022-15023). 
59 The advisory panel can be expected to increase transparency because OMB intends its meetings to be open.   
OMB (2002a, 15023).         15
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